[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link bookThe Ethics PART III 104/150
Q.E.D. Note .-- When, therefore, as we said in the note to III.
lii., we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being courageous. PROP.LVI.
There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Proof .-- Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or passive states (III.xi.
note); now we are necessarily passive (III.
i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so far as we have such ideas are we passive (III.
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