Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another.

Lastly, it follows from the foregoing proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.

Thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is passive.

It remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active.
PROP.LVIII.

Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
Proof .-- When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity, it feels pleasure (III.