[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link book
The Ethics

PART III
117/150

But, in the same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire.

For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite.

Thus, in order to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse.

I might, indeed, have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from such a definition (cf.II.

xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite.


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