[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link bookThe Ethics PART III 148/150
In fact, these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the appetite and love of such.
Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will speak presently. The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them.
However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens.
If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only. GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another. Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea.
For we have shown that the mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.
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