xliii.); therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason.

Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III.iii., and note).
Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive.

But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def.

of the Emotions, iv.
explanation); and desire (Def.

of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.
Q.E.D.
Another Proof .-- A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in the preface to Pt.