[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link book
The Ethics

PREFACE
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II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas.

Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason.

Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind.
PROP.LX.

Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.
Proof .-- Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining parts (IV.

vi.).


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