We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future.[15] [15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris boni." (Pollock, p.

268, note.) Proof .-- If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present (IV.

lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV.

lxv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, &c.

Q.E.D.
Corollary .-- We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.