Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing.

How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part.
APPENDIX.
What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads.
I.

All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.
II.

Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
III.

Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good.