Q.E.D.
Corollary .-- From the remarks made in Def.vi.of this part it follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.
PROP.XI.

An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which possible, or contingent, or non--necessary.
Proof .-- In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary (I.xxxiii.note.

i.); wherefore (IV.

ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is non--necessary.

Q.E.D.
PROP.XII.