Q.E.D.
Corollary .-- An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
Proof .-- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future (IV.ix.

Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.
x.).

Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is, nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us.

Q.E.D.
PROP.XIII.

Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.
Proof .-- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence of the said thing (IV.Def.