[The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza]@TWC D-Link book
The Ethics

PREFACE
33/145

There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired.

Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with our nature.

For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly.
Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man--nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
Hence, men who are governed by reason--that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.
Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail.

I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto proceeded.
PROP.XIX.

Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
Proof .-- The knowledge of good and evil is (IV.


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