xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV.

xi.).
But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II.xxxv.

note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all.

Q.E.D.
PROP.VI.

The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.
Proof .-- The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III.