And exactly on that very account the danger of any particular demand on that reserve is augmented, because the magnitude of the fund upon which that demand falls is diminished.

So that our one-reserve system of banking combines two evils: first, it makes the demand of the brokers upon the final reserve greater, because under it so many bankers remove so much money from the brokers; and under it also the final reserve is reduced to its minimum point, and the entire system of credit is made more delicate, and more sensitive.
The peculiarity, indeed, of the effects of the one reserve is indeed even greater in this respect.

Under the natural system, the bill-brokers would be in no respect the rivals of the bankers which kept the ultimate reserve.

They would be rather the agents for these bankers in lending upon certain securities which they did not themselves like, or on which they did not feel competent to lend safely.

The bankers who in time of panic had to help them would in ordinary times derive much advantage from them.