[A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume]@TWC D-Link book
A Treatise of Human Nature

PART IV
75/144

If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of a real, continued, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on.
To begin with the examination of motion; it is evident this is a quality altogether inconceivable alone, and without a reference to some other object.

The idea of motion necessarily supposes that of a body moving.
Now what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible?
It must resolve itself into the idea of extension or of solidity; and consequently the reality of motion depends upon that of these other qualities.
This opinion, which is universally acknowledged concerning motion, I have proved to be true with regard to extension; and have shewn that it is impossible to conceive extension, but as composed of parts, endowed with colour or solidity.

The idea of extension is a compound idea; but as it is not compounded of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, it must at last resolve itself into such as are perfectly simple and indivisible.

These simple and indivisible parts, not being ideas of extension, must be non entities, unless conceived as coloured or solid.
Colour is excluded from any real existence.

The reality, therefore, of our idea of extension depends upon the reality of that of solidity, nor can the former be just while the latter is chimerical.


<<Back  Index  Next>>

D-Link book Top

TWC mobile books