But it is impossible anything divisible can be conjoined to a thought or perception, which is a being altogether inseparable and indivisible.

For supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body?
On the surface or in the middle?
On the back or fore side of it?
If it be conjoined with the extension, it must exist somewhere within its dimensions.

If it exist within its dimensions, it must either exist in one particular part; and then that particular part is indivisible, and the perception is conjoined only with it, not with the extension: Or if the thought exists in every part, it must also be extended, and separable, and divisible, as well as the body; which is utterly absurd and contradictory.

For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness?
Thought, therefore, and extension are qualities wholly incompatible, and never can incorporate together into one subject.
This argument affects not the question concerning the substance of the soul, but only that concerning its local conjunction with matter; and therefore it may not be improper to consider in general what objects are, or are not susceptible of a local conjunction.

This is a curious question, and may lead us to some discoveries of considerable moment.
The first notion of space and extension is derived solely from the senses of sight and feeling; nor is there any thing, but what is coloured or tangible, that has parts disposed after such a manner, as to convey that idea.