The heavy bombardment of the coast batteries by our own shore guns, which had been greatly strengthened for the purpose, the rapidity of the landing, the use of a dense smoke screen, the fact of the landing being a complete surprise, the use of tanks for dealing with hostile machine guns, the interruption to the enemy's shore communications by heavy artillery fire, and the bombardment by monitors of the coast well to the eastward of the landing place as a feint, were all new factors, and all promised to assist towards success.
Of the supreme importance of the operation there could be no question.
Ever since 1914 the Navy had been pressing for the recapture of the ports on the Belgian coast, and they could only be taken by means of a combined operation.

Sir John French (now Field-Marshal Viscount French) himself had in the early days of the war pointed, out the great importance of securing the coast, but circumstances beyond his control were too powerful for him.
It was in these circumstances that the decision to undertake the operation was made, and when it became necessary to abandon it owing to the inability of the Army to co-operate the intense disappointment felt by all those who had worked so hard to ensure its success can be realized.
The Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla of destroyers, was the only other British force stationed in south-eastern waters if we except the local craft at the Nore.

The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla were under the command of Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt, an officer whose vessels were, if we except the Dover patrol, more frequently in contact with the enemy than any other British force in Home waters.

Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt had several functions to perform: (1) It was always hoped that he would be able to join forces with the Grand Fleet should events foreshadow a meeting with the High Sea Fleet.
(2) We depended very largely on him for reconnaissance work in the southern part of the North Sea and into the German Bight.
(3) It fell to his lot as a rule to provide the covering force for aerial operations carried out from seaplane carriers in southern waters.
(4) His force was best placed to cut off any enemy light craft that might be located in southern waters and to attack Zeppelins at sea on their return from raids over England.
(5) He was called upon almost weekly to cover the passage of the convoy of merchant ships between the Thames and Holland known as the "Dutch Convoy." (6) He was constantly called upon the provide reinforcements for the Dover Patrol or to assist in operations carried out by the latter force.
These miscellaneous duties involved a great deal of work for the Harwich force and particularly for the destroyers.
The necessity for continually providing reinforcements from the Harwich force for the Dover Patrol was a standing handicap to Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt's operations; he took the matter philosophically, although I always realized how difficult it made his work at times, and whenever, as was frequent, combined operations were carried out by the two forces, the greatest harmony prevailed between the Commands.
At the commencement of 1917 the Harwich force comprised 8 light cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders and 45 destroyers.

During the year new vessels were either added to it or replaced older craft which were withdrawn for other services, and at the end of the year the force included 9 light cruisers, 4 flotilla leaders and 24 destroyers.
The force was constantly operating in the outer waters of the Heligoland Bight to seaward of our minefields.