The objects of the presence of our ships in these waters, in addition to reconnaissance work and aerial operations, were: (a) To intercept any enemy light forces which might be intending to operate off our coasts or which might be on passage between German ports.
(b) To surprise and attack enemy minesweeping vessels.
(c) To destroy Zeppelins either on reconnaissance or raiding work.
(d) To capture enemy merchant ships trading between Dutch and German ports, or neutrals with contraband trading to Germany.
The opportunities that were given to the force under heading (a) were exceedingly rare during the year 1917, when even the light forces of the High Sea Fleet were content to remain almost constantly in port except when engaged in the operations in the Baltic, and excepting also on the two occasions on which attacks were made on the Scandinavian convoy; but a portion of the Harwich force succeeded on one occasion in intercepting a flotilla of German destroyers _en route_ to Zeebrugge from German ports with the result that one destroyer was seriously damaged and forced into the Dutch port of Ymuiden and another either sunk or badly damaged.
Forces from Harwich also succeeded in capturing or sinking twenty-four merchant ships trading between Antwerp and Dutch ports and Germany during the year, but the main result of the operations of this force was shown in the refusal of the enemy to risk his vessels except under cover of darkness in the area in which the Harwich force worked.
The duty of protecting the Dutch convoy imposed a heavy strain upon the Harwich force.

During the year 1917, 520 eastbound and 511 westbound vessels were convoyed between Dutch and British ports with the loss of only four ships by submarine attack, one by destroyer attack, and one by mine.

The price paid by the force for this success was the loss of four destroyers by mines, and one by collision, and the damage of three destroyers by mine or torpedo, and of five destroyers and one light cruiser by collision.

The frequent collisions were due to the conditions under which the traffic was carried out at night without lights, and to the prevalence of fogs.

The procedure adopted by the force was frequently changed as it necessarily became known to the Germans.
The extraordinarily small losses in the convoys were a very great tribute to the handling of the protecting force and to the organization in Holland for arranging sailings, when it is borne in mind that it was almost impossible to prevent leakage of information to German agents once the time of sailing was given out, and that the convoys were open to attack from destroyers and submarines operating either from Zeebrugge or from the Ems or other German ports.