[The Crisis of the Naval War by John Rushworth Jellicoe]@TWC D-Link bookThe Crisis of the Naval War CHAPTER X 9/20
The change was, of course, an experiment; the danger lay in the fact that, until technical and Admiralty experience has been gained, even men of the greatest ability in other walks of life may find it difficult to produce satisfactory results even if there are no limits imposed on the size of the Staff which assists them. The question of production is best examined under various headings and the results under the old Admiralty organization compared with those under the new, although comparison is admittedly difficult owing to changing conditions. WARSHIP PRODUCTION Under the Admiralty organization existing up to May, 1917, the Third Sea Lord--as the Controller was termed when changes were introduced by Mr. Churchill in 1912--was head of the Departments of the Director of Naval Construction and Engineer in Chief, and of that part of the work of the Director of Naval Ordnance which dealt with the design and production of guns and gun mountings.
Under the new organization a civilian Controller became responsible for production, the Third Sea Lord being associated with him on technical matters of design. A special department for warship production and repairs was set up under a Deputy Controller, the Third Sea Lord having no authority over this department except by his association with the Controller. Under the old organization it had been the custom during the war for the Third Sea Lord to give to the Board and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet a personal forecast of the anticipated dates of completion of all warships under construction.
My experience whilst in command of the Grand Fleet had been that this personal forecast was generally fairly accurate for six months ahead. As an example it may be stated that in the first four months of 1917 the delivery of destroyers _was within one of the forecast_ made in October, 1916, four vessels of the class being slightly behind and three ahead of the forecast.
Of thirteen "E" class submarines forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery by March, 1917, all except two were delivered by April; of twelve "K" class submarines forecasted for delivery in the same period, all except three were delivered by April, 1917.
It should be stated that these "K" class submarines were vessels of a new type, involving new problems of some difficulty. On the other hand there was considerable delay in the completion of a number of the thirty "P" boats forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery during the first seven months of 1917, and the April forecast showed that only twenty out of the thirty would be delivered during that period.
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