It had the same object as the guaranty in the Covenant, though it went even further in the assurance of affirmative action, and was, therefore, open to the same objections on the grounds of constitutionality and policy as Article 10.
In a note, dated March 20, stating my "Impressions as to the Present Situation," I discussed the endeavors being made by the President to overcome opposition and to remove obstacles to the acceptance of his plan for a League of Nations by means of compromises and concessions.

In the note appears the following: "An instance of the lengths to which these compromises and makeshifts are going, occurred this morning when Colonel House sent to Mr.
White, General Bliss, and me for our opinion the following proposal: That the United States, Great Britain, and France enter into a formal alliance to resist any aggressive action by Germany against France or Belgium, and to employ their military, financial, and economic resources for this purpose in addition to exerting their moral influence to prevent such aggression.
"We three agreed that, if that agreement was made, the chief reason for a League of Nations, as now planned, disappeared.

So far as France and Belgium were concerned the alliance was all they needed for their future safety.

They might or might not accept the League.
Of course they would if the alliance depended upon their acceptance.
They would do most anything to get such an alliance.
"The proposal was doubtless made to remove two provisions on which the French are most insistent: _First_, an international military staff to be prepared to use force against Germany if there were signs of military activity; _second_, the creation of an independent Rhenish Republic to act as a 'buffer' state.

Of course the triple alliance would make these measures needless.
"What impressed me most was that to gain French support for the League the proposer of the alliance was willing to destroy the chief feature of the League.