All this was to be done without going through the American constitutional process of obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate to the Covenant and to the principal settlements.

The intent seemed to be to respond to the popular demand for an immediate peace and at the same time to checkmate the opponents of the Covenant in the Senate by having the League of Nations organized and functioning before the definitive treaty was laid before that body.
When the President advanced this extraordinary theory of the nature of a preliminary treaty during a conversation, of which I made a full memorandum, I told him that it was entirely wrong, that by whatever name the document was called, whether it was "armistice," "agreement," "protocol," or "_modus_," it would be a treaty and would have to be sent by him to the Senate for its approval.

I said, "If we change the _status_ from war to peace, it has to be by a ratified treaty.

There is no other way save by a joint resolution of Congress." At this statement the President was evidently much perturbed.

He did not accept it as conclusive, for he asked me to obtain the opinion of others on the subject.