I think that the same reason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced the course of the President.

My impression at the time was that the Colonel favored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it the full plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to be impracticable.
There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programme prepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been a preliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed the negotiations as to a League.

Possibly the President realized that this danger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason was unwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty be drawn.

At least it may have added another reason for his proceeding without advising the Commissioners of his purposes.
As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took place at Paris, President Wilson's inherent dislike to depart in the least from an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems to me to have been the most potent influence in determining his method of work during the Peace Conference.

He seemed to think that, having marked out a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would show intellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose.