He will sink in the estimation of the delegates who are not within the inner circle, and what will be still more disastrous will be the loss of confidence among the peoples of the nations represented here.

A grievous blunder has been made." The views, which I expressed in this note in regard to the unwisdom of the President's course, were not new at the time that I wrote them.

Over two months before I had watched the practice of secret negotiation with apprehension as to what the effect would be upon the President's influence and standing with the delegates to the Conference.

I then believed that he was taking a dangerous course which he would in the end regret.

So strong was this conviction that during a meeting, which the President held with the American Commissioners on the evening of January 29, I told him bluntly--perhaps too bluntly from the point of view of policy--that I considered the secret interviews which he was holding with the European statesmen, where no witnesses were present, were unwise, that he was far more successful in accomplishment and less liable to be misunderstood if he confined his negotiating to the Council of Ten, and that, furthermore, acting through the Council he would be much less subject to public criticism.