For, according to him, "innate notions, being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of several other circumstances in order to the soul's exerting them," all that he says for "innate, imprinted, impressed notions" (for of innate IDEAS he says nothing at all), amounts at last only to this--that there are certain propositions which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet "by assistance from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation," it may AFTERWARDS come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirmed in my First Book.

For I suppose by the "soul's exerting them," he means its beginning to know them; or else the soul's 'exerting of notions' will be to me a very unintelligible expression; and I think at best is a very unfit one in this, it misleading men's thoughts by an insinuation, as if these notions were in the mind before the 'soul exerts them,' i.e.

before they are known;--whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind but a capacity to know them, when the 'concurrence of those circumstances,' which this ingenious author thinks necessary 'in order to the soul's exerting them,' brings them into our knowledge.
P.52 I find him express it thus: 'These natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation.' Here, he says, they 'exert themselves,' as p.

78, that the 'soul exerts them.' When he has explained to himself or others what he means by 'the soul's exerting innate notions,' or their 'exerting themselves;' and what that 'previous cultivation and circumstances' in order to their being exerted are--he will I suppose find there is so little of controversy between him and me on the point, bating that he calls that 'exerting of notions' which I in a more vulgar style call 'knowing,' that I have reason to think he brought in my name on this occasion only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me; which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done everywhere he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others have done, a title I have no right to.
There are so many instances of this, that I think it justice to my reader and myself to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those who peruse it with that attention and indifferency, which every one who will give himself the pains to read ought to employ in reading; or else that I have written mine so obscurely that it is in vain to go about to mend it.

Whichever of these be the truth, it is myself only am affected thereby; and therefore I shall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be said in answer to those several objections I have met with, to passages here and there of my book; since I persuade myself that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or false, will be able to see that what is said is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my opposer come both to be well understood.
If any other authors, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have published their censures of my Essay, with this honour done to it, that they will not suffer it to be an essay, I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and shall not waste my reader's time in so idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others, in so hasty a confutation of what I have written.
The booksellers preparing for the Fourth Edition of my Essay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit.