[An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I. by John Locke]@TWC D-Link bookAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I. CHAPTER XVII 11/20
For, I think it is evident, that the addition of finite things together (as are all lengths whereof we have the positive ideas) can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite than as number does; which consisting of additions of finite units one to another, suggests the idea of infinite, only by a power we find we have of still increasing the sum, and adding more of the same kind; without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression. 14.
How we cannot have a positive idea of infinity in Quantity. They who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive, seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument, taken from the negation of an end; which being negative, the negation on it is positive.
He that considers that the end is, in body, but the extremity or superficies of that body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black or white, will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure negation.
Nor is it, when applied to duration, the bare negation of existence, but more properly the last moment of it.
But as they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence, I am sure they cannot deny but the beginning of the first instant of being, and is not by any body conceived to be a bare negation; and therefore, by their own argument, the idea of eternal, PARTE ANTE, or of a duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea. 15.
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