[An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I. by John Locke]@TWC D-Link book
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume I.

CHAPTER I
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And so not innate.
Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate;--it being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows anything else.

Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on.

Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear.
27.

Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shows itself clearest.
That the general maxims we are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident they have not an universal assent, nor are general impressions.

But there is this further argument in it against their being innate: that these characters, if they were native and original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them; and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that they are not innate, since they are least known to those in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour.


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