Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one's observation.

And then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember, as an idea he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without THAT consciousness is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance.
For what is not either actually in view or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it had never been there.

Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark; and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had.

This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind.

I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind?
And I think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all.