[An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume II. by John Locke]@TWC D-Link bookAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume II. CHAPTER IV 8/14
But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself.
In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no DEFINITION of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the SOUND light or red, by itself. For, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible; and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses.
Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay.
And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of definition.
The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already.
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