34.
They said to this;--that as all the courts of justice do execute their sentences in the King's name, and this by his own law, and therefore by his authority, so much more might his Parliament do.
A very sound argument is here disguised in a false analogy, an inapplicable precedent, and a sophistical form.

Courts of justice administer the total of the supreme power retrospectively, involved in the name of the most dignified part.

But here a part, as a part, acts as the whole, where the whole is absolutely requisite,--that is, in passing laws; and again as B.and C.usurp a power belonging to A.by the determination of A.B.and C.The only valid argument is, that Charles had by acts of his own ceased to be a lawful King.
Ib.p.

40.
And that the authority and person of the King were inviolable, out of the reach of just accusation, judgment, or execution by law; as having no superior, and so no judge.
But according to Grotius, a king waging war against the lawful copartners of the 'summa potestas' ceases to be their king, and if conquered forfeits to them his former share.

And surely if Charles had been victor, he would have taken the Parliament's share to himself.