* * To this head belongs that perplexing question (beset with difficulties on all sides), whether the divine substance be extended or no.
Surely, the far larger part of these assumed difficulties rests on a misapplication either of the senses to the sense, or of the sense to the understanding, or of the understanding to the reason;--in short, on an asking for images where only theorems can be, or requiring theorems for thoughts, that is, conceptions or notions, or lastly, conceptions for ideas.
Query XXIII.p.

351.
But taking advantage of the ambiguity of the word 'hypostasis', sometimes used to signify substance, and sometimes person, you contrive a fallacy.
And why did not Waterland lift up his voice against this mischievous abuse of the term 'hypostasis', and the perversion of its Latin rendering, 'substantia' as being equivalent to [Greek: ousia]?
Why [Greek: ousia] should not have been rendered by 'essentia', I cannot conceive.

'Est' seems a contraction of 'esset', and 'ens' of 'essens': [Greek: on, ousa, ousia] = 'essens, essentis, essentia'.
Ib.p.

354.
Let me desire you not to give so great a loose to your fancy in divine things: you seem to consider every thing under the notion of extension and sensible images.
Very true.

The whole delusion of the Anti-Trinitarians arises out of this, that they apply the property of imaginable matter--in which A.is, that is, can only be imagined, by exclusion of B.as the universal predicate of all substantial being.
Ib.p.