They are only relatively ends in a chain of motives.

B.is the end to A.; but it is itself a mean to C., and in like manner C.is a mean to D., and so on.

Thus words are the means by which we reduce appearances, or things presented through the senses, to their several kinds, or 'genera'; that is, we generalize, and thus think and judge.

Hence the understanding, considered specially as an intellective power, is the source and faculty of words;--and on this account the understanding is justly defined, both by Archbishop Leighton, and by Immanuel Kant, the faculty that judges by, or according to, sense.
However, practical or intellectual, it is one and the same understanding, and the definition, the medial faculty, expresses its true character in both directions alike.

I am urgent on this point, because on the right conception of the same, namely, that understanding and sense (to which the sensibility supplies the material of outness, 'materiam objectivam',) constitute the natural mind of man, depends the comprehension of St.Paul's whole theological system.