[Coleridge’s Literary Remains, Volume 4. by Samuel Taylor Coleridge]@TWC D-Link bookColeridge’s Literary Remains, Volume 4. PART IV 58/72
But though the former assurance does not differ from the latter in the degree, it is altogether diverse in the kind; the senses being morally passive, while the conscience is essentially connected with the will, though not always, nor indeed in any case, except after frequent attempts and aversions of will, dependent on the choice.
Thence we call the presentations of the senses impressions, those of the conscience commands or dictates.
In the senses we find our receptivity, and as far as our personal being is concerned, we are passive;--but in the fact of the conscience we are not only agents, but it is by this alone, that we know ourselves to be such; nay, that our very passiveness in this latter is an act of passiveness, and that we are patient ('patientes')--not, as in the other case, 'simply' passive.
The result is, the consciousness of responsibility; and the proof is afforded by the inward experience of the diversity between regret and remorse. If I have sound ears, and my companion speaks to me with a due proportion of voice, I may persuade him that I did not hear, but cannot deceive myself.
But when my conscience speaks to me, I can, by repeated efforts, render myself finally insensible; to which add this other difference in the case of conscience, namely, that to make myself deaf is one and the same thing with making my conscience dumb, till at length I become unconscious of my conscience.
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