Brutes may be, and are scions, but those beings only, who have an I, 'scire possunt hoc vel illud una cum seipsis'; that is, 'conscire vel scire aliquid mecum', or to know a thing in relation to myself, and in the act of knowing myself as acted upon by that something.
Now the third person could never have been distinguished from the first but by means of the second.

There can be no He without a previous Thou.
Much less could an I exist for us, except as it exists during the suspension of the will, as in dreams; and the nature of brutes may be best understood, by conceiving them as somnambulists.

This is a deep meditation, though the position is capable of the strictest proof,--namely, that there can be no I without a Thou, and that a Thou is only possible by an equation in which I is taken as equal to Thou, and yet not the same.

And this again is only possible by putting them in opposition as correspondent opposites, or correlatives.

In order to this, a something must be affirmed in the one, which is rejected in the other, and this something is the will.