60, 61.
Religion is a system of 'revealed' truth; and to affirm of any revealed truth, that we 'cannot understand' it, is, in effect, either to deny that it has been revealed, or--which is the same thing--to admit that it has been revealed in vain.
It is too worthless! I cannot go on.

Merciful God! hast thou not revealed to us the being of a conscience, and of reason, and of will;--and does this Barrister tell us, that he "understands" them?
Let him know that he does not even understand the very word understanding.
He does not seem to be aware of the school-boy distinction between the [Greek: hoti esti] and the [Greek: dioti]?
But to all these silly objections religion must for ever remain exposed as long as the word Revelation is applied to any thing that can be 'bona fide' given to the mind 'ab extra', through the senses of eye, ear, or touch.

No! all revelation is and must be 'ab intra'; the external 'phaenomena' can only awake, recall evidence, but never reveal.

This is capable of strict demonstration.
Afterwards the Barrister quotes from Thomas Watson respecting things above comprehension in the study of nature: "in these cases, the 'fact' is evident, the cause lies in obscurity, deeply removed from all the knowledge and penetration of man." Then what can we believe respecting these causes?
And if we can believe nothing respecting them, what becomes of them as arguments in support of the proposition that we ought, in religion, to believe what we cannot understand?
Are there not facts in religion, the causes and constitution of which are mysteries?
[Footnote 1: Hints to the Public and the Legislature on the nature and effect of Evangelical Preaching.

By a Barrister.