The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this duty, and thus served the interests of the community?
And this not merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the State, and thus indirectly its higher aims.
It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be erroneous.

Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy.
"Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means; that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures are permissible.
[Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual.

So far as I know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel bound to attempt one at this point.

War, with which I am dealing at present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the seriousness of warlike measures.

I must deviate here a little from my main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of political morality.
The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is generally assumed.