Such a position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties are determined to employ them.

I believe after all that a conflict between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately moral nature of that end.
Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action.
But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable.

There are conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the infringement of the right appears morally justified.

York's decision to conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral.

Now it is always justifiable to terminate an immoral situation.
As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful methods are insufficient to secure its integrity.