Such a contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.
England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean.

She possesses in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in commanding this great road through the Mediterranean.

England's Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against England _and_ France.

Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged.

She is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development.