From the superiority of the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without difficulty have its base on our coasts.

Such an operation would enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, after investing Metz and Diedenhofen.
[Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.] England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of an ally who would lead the main attack.

England's troops would only serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign.
English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not coincident with those of France.
The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any further expansion of our power.

But it is not her interest to destroy our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the supremacy in Europe.

English interests demand a certain equilibrium between the Continental States.