Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely defensive and as offensive works.

Our whole future history may turn upon the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength between the two fleets would be gradually equalized.

Our ships, it must be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast fortifications hold out.
No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows.
Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers.
The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy "scouting" by the help of the air-fleet.

The importance of the air-fleet must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by attacking them directly.
If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing forces.

These possibilities are, however, vague.