It requires some observation of the peculiar characteristics of the different minds acted upon, and of the effects produced, and often some intelligent modification of the measures is required, to fit them to varying circumstances and times.
_Obedience must not be Bought_.
If the bestowing of commendation and rewards is made a matter of mere blind routine, as the assigning of gentle penalties may be, the result will become a mere system of _bribing_, or rather paying children to be good; and goodness that is bought, if it deserves the name of virtue at all, is certainly virtue of a very inferior quality.
Whether a reward conferred for obedience shall operate as a bribe, or rather as a price paid--for a _bribe_, strictly speaking, is a price paid, not for doing right, but for doing wrong--depends sometimes on very slight differences in the management of the particular case--differences which an undiscriminating mother will not be very ready to appreciate.
A mother, for example, going into the village on a summer afternoon, leaves her children playing in the yard, under the general charge of Susan, who is at work in the kitchen, whence she can observe them from time to time through the open window.

She thinks the children will be safe, provided they remain in the yard.

The only thing to be guarded against is the danger that they may go out through the gate into the road.
_Two Different Modes of Management_.
Under some circumstances, as, for example, where the danger to which they would be exposed in going into the road was very great, or where the mother can not rely upon her power to control her children's conduct by moral means in any way, the only safe method would be to fasten the gate.

But if she prefers to depend for their safety on their voluntary obedience to her commands, and wishes, moreover, to promote the spirit of obedience by rewarding rather than punishing, she can make her rewards of the nature of hire or not, according to her mode of management.
If she wishes to _hire_ obedience, she has only to say to the children that she is going into the village for a little time, and that they may play in the yard while she is gone, but must not go out of the gate; adding, that she is going to bring home some oranges or candies, which she will give them if she finds that they have obeyed her, but which she will not give them if they have disobeyed.
Such a promise, provided the children have the double confidence in their mother which such a method requires--namely, first, a full belief that she will really bring home the promised rewards, if they obey her; and secondly--and this is a confidence much less frequently felt by children, and much less frequently deserved by their mothers--a conviction that, in case they disobey, no importunities on their part or promises for the next time will induce their mother to give them the good things, but that the rewards will certainly be lost to them unless they are deserved, according to the conditions of the promise--in such a case--that is, when this double confidence exists, the promise will have great influence upon the children.
Still, it is, in its nature, _hiring_ them to obey.

I do not say that this is necessarily a bad plan, though I think there is a better.