Organized insurrection had, in fact, begun.
"The Government," said Washington, "could no longer remain a passive spectator of the contempt with which the laws were treated." But when he called for Cabinet opinions, the old variance at once showed itself.
Randolph thought that calm consideration of the situation "banishes every idea of calling the militia into immediate action." He pointed out that the disaffected region had more than fifteen thousand white males above the age of sixteen, and that sympathy with the insurgents was active in "several counties in Virginia having a strong militia." There was also the risk that the insurgents might seek British aid, in which case a severance of the Union might result.

Randolph also enlarged upon the expense that would attend military operations and questioned whether the funds could be obtained.

He advised a proclamation and the appointment of commissioners to treat with the insurgents.

Should such means fail, and should it appear that the judiciary authority was withstood, then at last military force might be employed.
Hamilton held that "a competent force of militia should be called forth and employed to suppress the insurrection, and support the civil authority." It appeared to him that "the very existence of the Government demands this course." He urged that the force employed ought "to be an imposing one, such, if practicable, as will deter from opposition, save the effusion of the blood of the citizens, and serve the object to be accomplished." He proposed a force of twelve thousand men, of whom three thousand were to be cavalry, and he advised that, in addition to the Pennsylvania militia, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia should each contribute a quota.
All the members of the Cabinet except Randolph concurred in Hamilton's opinion.

The practical execution of the measures was entrusted to Hamilton, who acted with great sagacity.