American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.
"3.

This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war." [229] Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities are absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack to be made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila.
There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which existed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

On January 25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong: "Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying our conduct nations." [230] Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington would take final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain on February 6, and said:-- "It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately before the ratification of the treaty.

A conflict after the ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public opinion." [231] Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation that hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answer meanwhile.

It was evidently well understood in Hongkong that Aguinaldo's receipt of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin, for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilities of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:-- "Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here denied Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote Senate to-day any ease insignificant skirmish due intentional provocation.
"_Bray_." [232] The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escape from the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on February 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberately precipitated by the Filipinos themselves.
Blount says:-- "It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war with us." [233] It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, but expect it they certainly did.