Let new charges be preferred, and let a new trial take place for his derelictions of duty during the term of his suspension.

Then, the lodge may again suspend him for a still longer period, or altogether expel him, if it finds him deserving such punishment.

But in the name of justice, law, and common sense, do not insiduously and unmanfully continue a sentence for one and a former offense, as a punishment for another and a later one, and that, too, without the due forms of trial.
Let us, in this case, go again for an analogy to the laws of the land.
Suppose an offender had been sentenced to an imprisonment of six months for a larceny, and that while in prison he had committed some new crime.
When the six months of his sentence had expired, would the Sheriff feel justified, or even the Judge who had sentenced him, in saying: "I will not release you; you have guilty of another offense during your incarceration, and therefore, I shall keep you confined six months longer ?" Certainly not.

The Sheriff or the Judge who should do so high-handed a measure, would soon find himself made responsible for the violation of private rights.

But the course to be pursued would be, to arrest him for the new offense, give him a fair trial, and, if convicted again, imprison or otherwise punish him, according to his new sentence, or, if acquitted, discharge him.
The same course should be pursued with a Mason whose conduct during the period of his suspension has been liable to reproach or suspicion.