We will not fall into the blunder of Piedmont, which has been more weakened than strengthened by the annexation of Naples." Of course he could not express this openly, and even now German writers obscure the thought, for in Germany, as in Italy, the desire for unity was so powerful that it was difficult to pardon any statesman who did not take the most immediate path to this result.

It was fortunate for Germany that Bismarck was strong enough not to do so, for the Confederation of the north could be founded and confirmed before the Catholic and hostile south was included.

The prize was in his hands; he deliberately refused to pick it up.
Supposing, however, that, after all, France would not accept the terms he suggested--during the anxious days which passed, this contingency was often before him.

It was not till the 14th that Goltz was able to send him any decisive information, for the very good reason that Napoleon had not until then made up his own mind.

Bismarck's anxiety was increased by the arrival of Benedetti.