They seem to find some pleasure in admiring him in the part of _Agent provocateur_.
Perhaps we may interpret his thought rather differently.

We have often seen that it was not his practice to lay down a clear and definite course of action, but he met each crisis as it occurred.

The immediate necessity was to secure the friendship of France; believing, as he did, that in politics no one acted simply on principle or out of friendship, he assumed that Napoleon, who had control of the situation, would not give his support unless he had the promise of some important recompense.
The natural thing for him, as he always preferred plain dealing, was to ask straight out what the Emperor wanted.

When the answer came, then fresh questions would arise; if it was of such a kind that Bismarck would be able to accept it, a formal treaty between the two States might be made; if it was more than Bismarck was willing to grant, then there would be an opportunity for prolonging negotiations with France, and haggling over smaller points, and he would be able to come to some agreement with Austria quickly.

If he could not come to any agreement with France, and war were to break out, he would always have this advantage, that he would be able to make it appear that the cause of war arose not in the want of moderation of Prussia, but in the illegitimate claims of France.