If the Prussian Government insisted on the necessity for a large and efficient army, they were accused of reckless militarism.

People forgot that the Prussian Monarchy could no more maintain itself without a large army than the British Empire could without a large navy.

In all the secret diplomatic negotiations of the time, the dismemberment of Prussia was a policy to be considered.

France wished to acquire part of the left bank of the Rhine, Austria had never quite given up hope of regaining part of Silesia; it was not fifty years since Prussia had acquired half the kingdom of Saxony; might not a hostile coalition restore this territory?
And then the philanthropy of England and the intrigues of France were still considering the possibility of a revived Poland, but in Poland would have to be included part of the territory which Prussia had acquired.
It is often said that from this conflict must be dated the great growth of militarism in Europe; it is to the victory of the King and Bismarck that we are to attribute the wars which followed and the immense armaments which since then have been built up in Europe.

To a certain extent, of course, this is true, though it is not clear that the presence of these immense armies is an unmixed evil.