If he could only hold Howe in the south, he was quite willing to trust Burgoyne to the rising of the people and to the northern wilderness.
Every effort he made was in this direction, beginning, as has been said, by his appeals to the New England governors in March.

Schuyler, on his part, was thoroughly imbued with Washington's other leading idea, that the one way to victory was by retarding the enemy.

At the outset everything went utterly and disastrously wrong.

Washington counted on an obstinate struggle, and a long delay at Ticonderoga, for he had not been on the ground, and could not imagine that our officers would fortify everything but the one commanding point.
The loss of the forts appalled the country and disappointed Washington, but did not shake his nerve for an instant.

He wrote to Schuyler: "This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much.
But notwithstanding things at present have a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General Burgoyne's army, and that the confidence derived from his success will hurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, be favorable to us.