But in respect to moral excellence, such knowledge is not enough: a man may do just or temperate acts, but he is not necessarily a just or temperate man, unless he does them with right intention and on their own account.

This state of the internal mind, which is requisite to constitute the just and temperate man, follows upon the habitual practice of just and temperate acts, and follows upon nothing else.
But most men are content to talk without any such practice.

They fancy erroneously that _knowing_, without doing, will make a good man.

[We have here the reaction against the Sokratic doctrine of virtue, and also the statement of the necessity of a _prosper motive_, in order to virtue.] Aristotle now sets himself to find a definition of virtue, _per genus et differentiam_.

There are three qualities in the Soul--_Passions_ [Greek: pathae], as Desire, Anger, Fear, &c., followed by pleasure or pain; _Capacities_ or _Faculties_ [Greek: dynameis], as our capability of being angry, afraid, affected by pity, &c.; _Fixed tendencies, acquirements_, or _states_ [Greek: hexeis].