Desire is often opposed to it; the incontinent man acts upon his desires, but without any purpose, or even against his purpose; the continent man acts upon his purpose, but against his desires.

Purpose is still more distinct from anger, and is even distinct (though in a less degree) from wish [Greek: boulaesis], which is choice of the End, while Purpose is of the Means; moreover, we sometimes wish for impossibilities, known as such, but we never purpose them.

Nor is purpose identical with opinion [Greek: doxa], which relates to truth and falsehood, not to virtue and vice.

It is among our voluntary proceedings, and includes intelligence; but is it identical with predeliberated action and its results?
(II.) To answer this query, Aristotle analyzes the process of Deliberation, as to its scope, and its mode of operation.

We exclude from deliberation things Eternal, like the Kosmos, or the incommensurability of the side and the diagonal of a square; also things mutable, that are regulated by necessity, by nature, or by chance; things out of our power; also final ends of action, for we deliberate only about the _means_ to ends.