It would have been well if the method had never been departed from; a sound Psychology would have improved the induction, but would never have introduced any question except as to the relative strength of the different feelings operating as motives to voluntary conduct.
In one part of his argument, however, where he maintains that vice must be voluntary, because its opposite, virtue, is voluntary, he is already touching on the magical island of the bad enchantress; allowing a question of fact to be swayed by the notion of factitious dignity.

Virtue is assumed to be voluntary, not on the evidence of fact, but because there would be an _indignity_ cast on it, to suppose otherwise.

Now, this consideration, which Aristotle gives way to on various occasions, is the motive underlying the objectionable metaphor.
After the preceding digression on the Voluntary and Involuntary, Aristotle takes up the consideration of the Virtues in order, beginning with COURAGE, which was one of the received cardinal virtues, and a subject of frequent discussion.

(Plato, _Laches, Protagoras, Republic_, &c.) Courage [Greek: andreia], the mean between timidity and foolhardiness, has to do with evils.

All evils are objects of fear; but there are some evils that even the brave man does right to fear--as disgrace.
Poverty or disease he ought not to fear.