The Theory of the Standard (4) called the doctrine of the Moral Sense, proceeds upon the first view; on that theory, the Standard and the Faculty make properly but one question.

All other theories are more or less compatible with the composite or derivative nature of Conscience; the supporters of Utility, in particular, adopt this alternative.
2.

A second Psychological question, regarded by many (notably by Kant) as vitally implicated in Moral Obligation, is the Freedom of the Will.
The history of opinion on this subject has been in great part already given.
3.

Thirdly, It has been debated, on Psychological grounds, whether our Benevolent actions (which all admit) are ultimately modes of self-regard, or whether there be, in the human mind, a source of purely Disinterested conduct.

The first view, or the reference of benevolence to Self, admits of degrees and varieties of statement.
(1) It may be held that in performing good actions, we expect and obtain an immediate reward fully equivalent to the sacrifice made.
Occasionally we are rewarded in kind; but the reward most usually forthcoming (according to Mandeville), is praise or flattery, to which the human mind is acutely sensitive.
(2) Our constitution may be such that we are pained by the sight of an object in distress, and give assistance, to relieve ourselves of the pain.